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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Markov switching models with time-varying transition probabilities address the 
limitations  of  the  earlier  methods  in  the  early  warning  system  literature  on  currency 
crises.    Most  of  the  Markov  switching  models  in  the  literature  are  largely  based  on 
univariate models of exchange rate fluctuations.  In this thesis, the components of the 
index of speculative pressure are modeled using the Markov Switching VAR with time-
varying transition probabilities of Martinez Peria (2002).  Two approaches, both of which 
are derived from this model, are taken to determine the probability of a currency crisis:  
the probability of a turbulent regime and the expected value of the index of speculative 
pressure.  This study shows that the Markov Switching VAR model with time-varying 
transition probabilities is a good method to use in building an early warning system of a 
currency crisis.  Results show significant improvement on predicting the Asian Financial 
Crisis by signaling its occurrence at an earlier period with a higher probability when the 
probability of a turbulent regime approach is employed.  It is also more sensitive in 
detecting turbulent periods that are not necessarily currency crises and therefore renders 
itself  useful  in  short-term  forecasting  of  speculative  pressure  episodes.    The  leading 
indicators of the Asian Financial Crisis identified in this study are real effective exchange 
rate, export growth, GDP growth, real domestic credit, M2 ratio, deposits to M2 ratio and 
non-FDI flows. 
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I.  Introduction 
1.1  Background 
Financial  crises  had  come and  gone  and have  come time and again.    It  is  of 
interest to anyone who had experienced at least one in his lifetime and more importantly 
so with economists.  This is not an understatement given the disastrous consequence that 
comes  with  these  tumultuous  events  and  the  ramifications  to  economic  growth  and 
political  stability  afterwards.    Currency  crises  occur  as  an  outcome  of  unsustainable 
government policies and also as a consequence of speculative attack that is motivated by 
either self-fulfilling expectations or through contagion from crises occurring someplace 
else. 
A  currency  crisis  can  bring  down  a  country  not  just  economically  but  also 
politically.  The Argentinian crisis is an example of the collapse of a fixed exchange rate 
regime.  The devaluation of the Argentinian peso in 2002 precipitated the replacement of 
the presidency several times within days.  Another example of the collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate includes the attack on the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992-93 
which undermined the monetary union of the member currencies and made realignments 
unmanageable.  The Mexican peso crisis in 1994-95 is an example of a currency crisis 
that resulted in contagion; known as the Tequila crisis it subjected neighboring countries, 
and  even  including  the  Philippines,  to  speculative  pressures.    The  impact  of  the 
devaluation of the Thailand baht in July 1997 is another example of a currency crisis that 
led to the collapse of crawling peg regimes in East Asia resulting to the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997-98.  Other notable examples of speculative attacks in the last two decades 
were the attacks on the Russian ruble in 1998 and the Turkish currency and banking crisis 
in 2001. 
Economic theory attempts to understand the underlying causes of a currency crisis 
or periods of speculative attack that render  a currency  vulnerable to  devaluation.  A 
currency crisis can be characterized by a large and persistent depreciation of the currency.  
However, a speculative attack can occur even prior to devaluation.  This is manifested in 
a persistent decline in the foreign exchange (FX) reserve as the government attempts to 
defend a given exchange rate.   2 
Krugman  (1979),  in  a  seminal  work,  demonstrated  how  unsustainable 
macroeconomic  policies  being  pursued  by  a  government  lead  to  vulnerability  and 
eventual collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime.  For example, a persistent fiscal deficit 
or a gaping current account deficit strains a government’s ability to sustain a peg by 
financing the fiscal deficit or by filling the gap of current account deficit through the FX 
reserve.    Speculators  pressure  the  currency  to  devalue  by  purchasing  the  FX  reserve 
because they know that devaluation will eventually occur.  Capital outflow also adds 
pressure to the currency as short-term investors avoid foreign exchange losses for holding 
the local currency.  In the end, the FX reserve is depleted and the currency devalues. 
While the fundamentals-based currency crisis articulated by Krugman (1979) is 
theoretically elegant it is inadequate in explaining the EMS crisis in 1992-93.  Obstfeld 
(1994) proposed that self-fulfilling expectations can explain this crisis.  In self-fulfilling 
expectations a crisis can occur even without any visible macroeconomic weakness and 
even though the currency peg appears sustainable.  The experience of the EMS countries 
demonstrated this.  They did not exhibit the weakness in macroeconomic fundamentals 
assumed by the Krugman model and yet they experienced devaluations.  In the theory of 
self-fulfilling  crisis  there  is  a  feedback  effect  between  the  expectation  of  speculators 
regarding  devaluation  of  a  currency  and  the  response  of  government  policy  to  such 
expectation.  Such response serves as confirmation of the speculators’ expectation.  This 
feedback  between  speculators  and  the  government  proceeds  into  a  downward  spiral 
resulting in a self-inflicted currency crisis. 
The fundamentals and self-fulfilling approaches are referred to as the first and 
second generation theories of currency crises.  These theories however were not enough 
to explain the episodes of speculative pressure and eventual turbulence that happened to 
countries  affected by the Tequila crisis  in  1994-95 and the Asian Financial Crisis  in 
1997-98.  The Brazilian real and Argentinian peso experienced currency crises following 
the speculative attack and devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994-95.  In addition, the 
Philippines experienced speculative pressure in early 1995.  Proximity in terms of trade 
partnership may able to explain the experiences of Brazil and Argentina.  But not so with 
the Philippines other than that it had the same macroeconomic vulnerability as Mexico 
during that period.  Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996) suggest that this demonstrated the   3 
existence of multiple equilibria.  In this type of crisis according to Masson (1998), a 
country’s currency can be affected by a crisis from another country that could not be 
explained by economic fundamentals.  The market’s sentiment about the currency or the 
market’s perspective regarding new information about a particular country’s economy 
can change dramatically because of a crisis in another country.  When this happens the 
common action of investors is to dump assets in this currency and this action can lead to 
a crisis. 
While theories were developed to explain the economics of currency crises the 
empirical literature focused on estimating models that would best characterize the factors 
that led to these crises.  From an econometric modeling point-of-view there are four 
major methods used to evaluate the theories underlying currency crises:  cross-country 
regressions,  limited  dependent  variables  (LDV),  signaling  approach  and  Markov 
switching.  The cross-country regression and the limited dependent variable models use 
the  index  of  speculative  pressure  (ISP)  and  ISP  crisis  dummy  as  their  dependent 
variables, respectively.  The ISP typically consists of three components:  the changes in 
nominal exchange rate, FX reserve and interest rate differentials.  The signaling approach 
uses macroeconomic indicators which are evaluated on how well they can predict a crisis 
within a given period in the future.  The Markov switching models mainly use the change 
in the nominal exchange rate with the exception of Martinez Peria (2002) who modeled 
the ISP components in her study of the EMS crisis in 1992-93. 
The  cross-country  regression  model  of  Sachs,  Tornell  &  Velasco  (1996) 
attempted to explain the crisis from the fundamentals approach and found evidence of 
both macroeconomic and self-fulfilling factors that led to the Tequila crisis.  However, 
Berg  &  Patillo  (1999)  found  the  model  of  Sachs,  Tornell  &  Velasco  (1996)  to  be 
unstable.  The probit model of  Frankel  & Rose (1996) showed success in predicting 
currency crashes and in accounting for factors that influence these events.  However, 
LDV models  use  subjective classification of a crisis  period where potential  errors  of 
assignment can occur.  This problem can be dealt with using the Markov switching model 
of Hamilton (1989).  Markov switching models are an innovative tool for dating currency 
crises as well as determining the factors that lead an economy from one state to another, 
say, ordinary period to a turbulent one.  Engel & Hakkio (1996) started the use of Markov   4 
switching  models  in  the  study  of  currency  crises.    Eventually  this  led  to  the  use  of 
Markov switching in early warning system (EWS) models. 
The  EWS  initiated  by  Kaminsky,  Lizondo  &  Reinhart  (1998)  focused  on 
identifying  signals  that  would  indicate  a  potential  currency  crisis  within  a  given 
timeframe in the future.  The signaling approach is nonparametric because it involves a 
procedure, not an estimation of a model based on an underlying theoretical distribution, 
of identifying whether a macroeconomic variable serves as a good leading indicator of a 
crisis within a 24-month window where the threshold for each indicator is adjusted to 
maximize  the  signal-to-noise  ratio.  While  the  exercise  of  identifying  crises  was 
satisfactory  this  approach  has  been  criticized  for  the  subjective  thresholds  and  the 
potential misclassification of crises  when future turbulent periods are included in  the 
data.  New data can reset the thresholds thereby potentially reclassifying crises.  The 
Markov switching approaches in Cerra & Saxena (2002), Martinez Peria (2002), Abiad 
(2003), Mariano, Abiad, Gultekin, Shabbir & Tan (2003) and Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano & 
Tan  (2008)  deal  with  this  limitation  by  endogenously  classifying  the  periods  of 
turbulence. 
1.2  Research Problem 
One of the main limitations of an LDV model is the use of a dummy variable to 
identify currency crisis periods which is subject to misclassification and information loss.  
Similarly,  the  signaling  approach  depends  on  arbitrary  thresholds  set  for  the 
macroeconomic indicators.  These dependencies can result in crises disappearing when 
new data comes in containing new crisis information but this problem is avoided by 
endogenously identifying the crisis regime in the model.  This was the motivation behind 
the use of Markov switching  in  the EWS literature.  Abiad (2003),  Mariano, Abiad, 
Gultekin,  Shabbir  &  Tan  (2003)  and  Brunetti,  Scotti,  Mariano  &  Tan  (2008)  used 
Markov switching regression (MSR) models to identify the factors that influence the state 
of the economy to either a turbulent or an ordinary regime.  While their papers model the 
change  in  nominal  exchange  rate  where  the  underlying  regime  is  driven  by 
macroeconomic  factors  this  study  will  simultaneously  model  the  three  indicators 
associated with the ISP:  the change in nominal exchange rate, the change in foreign 
reserve and the change in the difference between local and foreign interest rates.  These   5 
three  indicators  will  be  modeled  using  Markov  switching  vector  autoregression 
(MSVAR) as suggested by Mariano, Abiad, Gultekin, Shabbir & Tan (2003).  Mariano, 
Abiad, Gultekin, Shabbir & Tan (2003) expect this approach to improve on the short-
term forecasting performance of the univariate RS approach.  The use of MSVAR with 
time-varying transition probabilities (TVTP) in an empirical currency crisis model was 
first implemented by Martinez Peria (2002) where the objective was on dating periods of 
currency crisis in the EMS countries.  In this study, the focus is on modeling the ISP 
indicators to build an EWS model. 
The ISP is an index commonly used to measure the extent of speculative attack on 
a  currency.    When  a  currency  becomes  vulnerable,  monetary  authorities  in  a  fixed 
exchange or in a crawling peg regime employ three measures.  The first is to defend the 
currency  by  selling  its  FX  reserve  thereby  depleting  it.    The  second  is  to  raise  the 
domestic interest rate.  And third, the currency depreciates when the government ceases 
to  defend  it.    Eichengreen,  Rose  &  Wyplosz  (1994,  1995,  1996),  among  other 
economists, made use of a linear combination of these three variables to build an ISP. 
This  study  develops  an  EWS  by  identifying  factors  that  can  serve  as  leading 
indicators of vulnerability of an economy from speculative attacks.  By using MSVAR 
with TVTP, the objective is to identify indicators that could signal ahead a turbulent 
regime.    By  endogenously  modeling  the  ordinary  periods  and  periods  of  speculative 
pressure using Markov switching this study avoids the problems associated with other 
econometric models.  The TVTP facilitates the identification of significant factors that 
influence the probability of an economy going into a turbulent period.  The MSVAR with 
TVTP will be specifically applied to Southeast Asian currencies.  
1.3  Significance and Contribution 
  This study contributes to the literature on EWS of currency crises using Markov 
switching models by employing the MSVAR with TVTP for the components of the ISP 
in identifying leading indicators of the Asian Financial Crisis.  It is also the first time that 
MSVAR with TVTP was used to analyze Asian Financial Crisis countries to identify 
macroeconomic indicators of turbulence in the currency markets and to determine its 
potential as method for early warning systems.  Furthermore, the study shows that using 
MSVAR with TVTP enhances prediction of turbulent periods and improves on short-  6 
term forecasting of speculative attacks when compared to univariate Markov switching 
models. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
  There  are  several  literature  reviews  on  the  theory  and  empirical  studies  of 
currency crises.  The purely theoretical review of Blackburn & Sola (1993) examined the 
incorporation of stylized facts prior to the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime based 
on the fundamentals theory of Krugman (1979) and Flood & Garber (1984) and the self-
fulfilling  crisis  theory  of  Obstfeld  (1986),  including  extensions  and  relaxations  of 
assumptions  of  the  primary  papers  of  these  first  and  second  generation  theories, 
respectively.    Another  literature  review  tested  the  theories  empirically  in  Garber  & 
Svensson  (1995).    The  literature  review  of  Eichengreen,  Rose  &  Wyplosz  (1996) 
classified  the  categories  into  three:    the  fundamentals,  multiple  equilibria  or  self-
fulfilling, and contagion.  The most recent comprehensive review was made by Abiad 
(2003).  He outlined the theories, the empirical studies and methodologies employed to 
explain  and  evaluate  the  forecast  of  currency  crises.    To  avoid  duplication  of  these 
reviews, this study instead outlines the main theories and methods while at the same time 
focuses  on  methods  recently  developed  on  early  warning  systems  based  on  Markov 
switching models. 
2.1  Theoretical Models 
2.1.1  Fundamentals 
  The first theory on currency crises was formally developed by Krugman (1979) 
where he demonstrated how the weakness in macroeconomic fundamentals of a country 
can  induce  speculators  to  bet  against  the  fixed  exchange  rate  regime.    As  monetary 
authorities defend the exchange rate by drawing down their FX reserves the fixed regime 
eventually collapses when the reserves are exhausted.  This collapse leads the currency to 
freely float. 
  Krugman (1979) showed that when the government is committed to maintaining 
the fixed exchange rate regime it gives up control of the level of FX reserve.  The level of 
FX reserve rather responds to changes in economic conditions.  When macroeconomic   7 
weakness,  e.g.  a  fiscal  deficit,  occurs  the  government  can  finance  it  through  issuing 
domestic credit or through its FX reserve.  However, both will have the consequence of 
drawing  down  reserves.    Prior  to  exhaustion  of  the  FX  reserve,  attack  begins  from 
speculators with foresight who expect the government will soon enough abandon the 
fixed exchange rate regime.  Speculators desiring to avoid capital losses on the domestic 
currency will demand for more FX leading to complete depletion of the reserves resulting 
in the collapse of the currency regime.  The time of the collapse of the regime according 
to Krugman (1979) can be known.  Flood & Garber (1984) extended the Krugman model 
by accounting for the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime, not based on a huge 
cataclysmic event due to weakness in fundamentals but rather on arbitrary speculative 
behavior.  This speculative behavior creates growing instability in a weak currency on a 
fixed exchange rate leading to its eventual collapse.  Unlike in the Krugman model, the 
timing of the collapse in Flood & Garber’s (1984) is assumed to be random. 
2.1.2  Self-fulfilling Crisis 
  While  Krugman  (1979)  showed  how  weakness  in  fundamentals  eventually 
unhinges a fixed exchange rate regime Obstfeld (1986) demonstrated that even without 
such weakness a crisis may ensue based on self-fulfilling expectations of a devaluation.  
The  seemingly  sustainable  fixed  exchange  rate  collapses  due  to  expectations  of  the 
market that it will occur with speculators putting pressure on the currency to devalue.  
The  monetary  authorities  respond  to  the  weakness  of  the  currency  by  defending  it.  
However,  the  feedback  between  speculators’  actions  and  the  monetary  authorities’ 
responses proceeds to a downward spiral resulting in a self-fulfilling crisis.  In another 
study, Dellas and Stockman (1993) have shown that the expectations of capital controls 
and devaluations can precipitate a currency crisis even when the fundamentals of the 
economy are intact.  
  Eichengreen & Wyplosz (1993) and Jeanne (1997)  provided evidence  of self-
fulfilling expectations on the French franc as it went on to devalue during the EMS crisis 
that unraveled in August 1993.  While Krugman (1979) puts emphasis on FX reserve 
adequacy, Obstfeld (1994) noted that during the EMS crisis some countries employed 
other tools like high interest rates in response to devaluation expectations.  The responses 
had  a  huge  negative  impact  on  a  country’s  fiscal  position  resulting  in  the  realized   8 
devaluation of its currency.  Governments also responded to shocks in competitiveness 
and employment by realigning their currencies.  This action changed expectations and 
turned a pegged currency into a fragile one. 
The  theory  of  self-fulfilling  expectations  is  not  without  its  critics.    Krugman 
(1996)  showed  that  when  fundamentals  deteriorate  deterministically  over  time  then 
multiple equilibria, and therefore self-fulfilling expectations, do not occur.  However, 
Jeanne & Masson (2000) provided conditions on the fundamentals whereby self-fulfilling 
expectations do occur and when they do not as in Krugman’s (1996) model. 
  Empirical studies on finding evidence of self-fulfilling expectations during the 
EMS  crisis  were  done  by  Eichengreen  &  Wyplosz  (1993),  on  the  Tequila  crisis  by 
Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1995)  and  on  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis  by  Radelet  &  Sachs 
(1998). 
2.1.3  Contagion 
  The  experience  in  the  EMS  and  the  Tequila  crises  also  showed  that  other 
currencies  can  be  subject  to  speculative  attacks  even  though  a  crisis  is  occurring 
someplace  else.    Gerlach  &  Smets  (1995)  provided  the  first  systematic  theoretical 
treatment of the concept of contagion in currency crises.  Their model of contagion is an 
extension to multiple countries of the model by Flood & Garber (1984) on a single-
country  speculative  attack.    Gerlach  &  Smets  (1995)  showed  that  contagion  occurs 
because the collapse of a currency may have effects on the prices and income of another 
country through competitiveness.  The collapse of a currency causes another country’s 
real exchange rate to appreciate and thereby depressing prices and income; the demand 
for money drops as a result and so FX reserves fall.  This reduction in reserves leads to 
speculative attacks on another country’s currency accelerating its implosion. 
Gerlach & Smets (1995) observed that the floating of the Finnish markka seemed 
to have influenced the turbulence in the Swedish krona, while the forced floating of the 
Italian lira and British pound could have been related to the speculative pressure on the 
French franc, and the floating of the Swedish krona affected the parity of the Norwegian 
krone.    Aside  from  evidence  of  self-fulfilling  expectations  found  by  Eichengreen  & 
Wyplosz (1993) during the EMS crisis Gerlach & Smets (1995) showed that contagion 
also occurred.   9 
Fratzscher (1999) demonstrated that the severity of a crisis in a country is not only 
determined by its fundamentals and exogenous agents’ belief but also by the degree of 
how crises in other countries are transmitted across economies.  He defined contagion as 
the transmission of a crisis that is not caused by the affected country’s fundamentals 
(only ex post) but by its proximity from the country where the crisis originated.  Here 
Fratzscher  (1999)  identified  two  types  of  proximity:    real  integration  contagion  and 
financial integration contagion.  The real integration contagion occurs when a crisis and 
sharp devaluation of a country’s currency results in the loss of competitiveness of its 
competitor countries whose currencies also devalue.  The financial integration contagion 
occurs  when  a  crisis  or  sharp  devaluation  makes  investors  withdraw  from  other 
economies to raise cash for redemptions or to follow other investors who fear that these 
economies will also experience currency attacks and devaluations. 
Another type of contagion is related to a banking crisis and was theoretically 
investigated by Goldfajn & Valdes (1997).  They found evidence that a fragile banking 
system that is subject to shortening liabilities that is matched to long term assets as an 
outcome of a surge in capital flow into the economy can be vulnerable to a run by foreign 
investors.    This  run  ramps  up  demand  for  foreign  reserves  putting  pressure  on  the 
currency.    If  there  is  expected  devaluation  in  the  currency  this  surge  in  demand  is 
exacerbated.  And investors that experience liquidity problems in a banking crisis in this 
country respond by liquidating their position in other countries as well, thus resulting in 
contagion. 
  Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996) explained that the Mexican peso crisis-initiated 
turbulence in the currencies of Argentina, Brazil and the Philippines was evidence of 
contagion.    These  countries  that  experienced  vulnerability  are  the  ones  with  weak 
fundamentals thereby initiating speculative pressures.  Using 1959 to 1993 data of 20 
industrialized  countries  Eichengreen,  Rose  &  Wyplosz  (1996)  have  shown  that 
accounting  for  fundamentals  and  policies,  there  exists  evidence  of  pure  contagion  in 
currency crises.  Furthermore, Frankel & Schmukler (1996) found evidence of herding 
behavior in the Mexican peso crisis. 
  On  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis,  Baig  &  Goldfajn  (1999)  found  evidence  of 
contagion through economic and political news in Asian countries.  Fratzscher (1999)   10 
showed that real integration and financial integration are the culprits of the contagion of 
the Mexican peso crisis and the Asian Financial Crisis.  Chang & Velasco (1998) blamed 
the  short-term  liabilities  of  banks  exceeding  the  foreign  reserves  during  the  Asian 
Financial Crisis.  Other evidence of contagion is in the studies of Goldfajn & Valdes 
(1997), Fratzscher (1998) and Glick and Rose (1999). 
In terms of the role of financial linkages Calvo and Mendoza (1999) argued that 
herding  behavior  causes  contagion.  They  explained  that  globalization  reduces  the 
incentive  to  get  information  first  hand  so  that  investors  follow  common  investment 
strategies.  Frankel and Schmuckler (1998) found evidence of this in the Tequila crisis.  
Fratzscher (1998) found evidence of contagion from the observed high correlations of 
equity returns of those countries affected by the Tequila crisis and the Asian Financial 
Crisis.    Kaminsky  &  Reinhart  (2000)  investigated  the  sources  of  contagion  through 
empirical evidence from the Tequila crisis, the Asian Financial Crisis and the Russian 
rubble crisis and found that trade links, financial sector links and cross-market hedging as 
potential  causes  of  contagion;  while  Cerra  &  Saxena  (2002)  linked  the  Thai  baht 
devaluation  to  the  Indonesian crisis  during the  Asian Financial Crisis to  demonstrate 
contagion. 
2.2  Econometric Methods 
  The investigation of the theories that explain the occurrence of currency crises 
and  periods  of  speculative  attacks  can  be  summarized  into  four  groups.    Three  are 
parametric models and one is a nonparametric model.  The parametric models consist of 
cross-country regressions, LDV and Markov switching, while the nonparametric model is 
the signaling approach.  
Before elaborating on these methods any further it is necessary to discuss first 
how economists date periods of speculative attacks and currency crises.  The ISP is a 
useful  measure  of  speculative  attack  on  a  currency  and  was  used  by  researchers  to 
identify turbulent episodes.  
  Most  of  the  research  papers  employ  the  ISP  which  was  first  introduced  by 
Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz (1994).  The ISP was a modification of Girton & Roper’s 
(1977) index of exchange-market pressure.  This index is based on their monetary model 
of money demand and supply.  The ISP is defined as a linear combination of the change   11 
in exchange rate ( ER  ), the change in FX reserve ( FR  ), and the change in interest 
differential ( ID  ).  This interest differential is between a country’s interest rate and the 
corresponding interest rate of the U.S. or of Germany.  Martinez Peria (2002) referred to 
Germany as the anchor country in Europe as other currencies realigned themselves to the 
deutsche mark during the EMS period.  The following is an ISP with three components 
where the standard deviation of each is equalized to  ER  ’s in the following sense: 
     t
ID
ER
t
FR
ER
t t ID FR ER ISP      








          (1) 
where 
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  
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
t
t t
t ER
ER ER
ER ,  t ER  is in currency per U.S. dollar, 
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1
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
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

t
t t
t FR
FR FR
FR , 
  1     t t t ID ID ID ,  t S U t country t IR IR ID ., . ,    and IR  is interest rate in %. 
  The  literature  has  different  variations  of  the  ISP.    Table  1  presents  these 
differences. 
 
Table 1.   Index of Speculative Pressure 
Author(s)  Components  Standard Deviation 
Equalizer 
Threshold Indicating Period of 
Speculative Attack 
Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz 
(1994) 
ΔER, ΔFR, ΔID 
ER      ISP  5 . 1   from the mean 
Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz 
(1995) 
ΔER, ΔID and ΔFR/M1 with 
respect to Germany’s  ER      ISP  2   from the mean 
Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz 
(1996) 
ΔER, ΔID and ΔFR/M1 with 
respect to Germany’s  ER      ISP  5 . 1   from the mean 
Frankel & Rose (1996)  ΔER, ΔID and ΔFR/M1 with 
respect to Germany’s  ER      ISP  2   from the mean 
Sachs, Tornell & Velasco 
(1996) 
ΔER, ΔFR  Relative precision 
using inverse of the 
variance of each 
series over the past 
10 years. 
No threshold. 
Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999)  ΔER, ΔFR 
ER      ISP  3   from the mean 
Tornell (1999)  ΔER, ΔFR  Relative precision 
using inverse of the 
variance of each 
series over the past 
10 years. 
No threshold. 
Note:  The signs of ΔER, ΔFR and ΔID in this table are opposite to those in Equation (1). 
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2.2.1  Cross-Country Regressions 
  Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996) employed a cross-country regression to study 
the nature of the Mexico peso crisis using an ISP of exchange rate and reserve changes as 
a  function  of  macroeconomic  indicators  among  20  emerging  economies.  Similarly, 
Tornell (1999) used the same ISP as Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996) for 23 emerging 
economies in his investigation of the Mexican peso crisis and the Asian Financial Crisis.  
However, Berg & Patillo (1999) showed that Sachs, Tornell & Velasco’s (1996) model 
has unstable parameters. 
2.2.2  Limited Dependent Variable 
  Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz (1996) used probit regression to study the currency 
crises in the 1960s until the EMS crisis.  They defined the ISP consisting of changes in 
exchange rate, reserves and the interest differential for 20 industrial countries where a 
crisis occurs when the index exceeds its mean by one and a half of its standard deviation.  
Frankel & Rose (1996) also used probit regression to study over a hundred developing 
countries for crises that occurred from the 1970s to prior to the EMS crisis.  A crash is 
measured as a 25% depreciation of a currency and a corresponding depreciation of at 
least 10% with respect to the previous year’s change occurring in a 3-year window. 
  In the Asian Development Bank (2005) edited book on EWS, a panel LDV model 
was  estimated  where  the  dependent  variable  is  determined  by  the  month-on-month 
change  in  nominal  exchange  rate  exceeding  the  downside  threshold  of  two  standard 
deviations from the mean.  In this panel LDV model, Koo, Oh, Joo, Lee & Tan (2005) 
analyzed how well this model predicted the Asian Financial Crisis in Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
2.2.3  Signaling Approach 
  Kaminsky, Lizondo & Reinhart (1998) proposed a signaling or leading indicator 
approach in forecasting currency crises.  In their exercise on the crises between 1970 and 
1995 among 15 developing and 5 developed countries they identified potential factors 
that exceed a given threshold.  They then tested whether a factor is able to predict a 
currency crisis within a 24-month window.  The thresholds were adjusted to balance the 
signal-to-noise ratio of correctly and incorrectly calling a crisis.  Kaminsky & Reinhart 
(1999) evaluated the signaling approach on the Asian Financial Crisis and found evidence   13 
of commonalities in leading indicators of banking and currency crisis from the 1970 to 
1995 that predicted well the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-98. 
2.2.4  Markov Switching 
  The LDV models and the signaling approach of Kaminsky, Lizondo & Reinhart 
(1998) are not without their problems.  First, the threshold to mark a period as turbulent 
or speculative is arbitrary.  Second, Abiad (2003) and Mariano, Abiad, Gultekin, Shabbir 
& Tan (2003) reasoned that the threshold may adjust higher depending on the severity of 
a future crisis making formerly classified periods of crisis disappear.  This means that the 
crisis in the future can influence identification of crisis periods in the past.  Third, there is 
a  possible  misclassification  of  a  crisis  in  LDV  models.    Abiad  (2003)  noted  that 
arbitrarily set thresholds in the signaling approach introduces serial correlation in the 
dependent variable and Harding & Pagan (2008) showed analytically that it exists. 
  These inherent limitations of LDV models and of the signaling approach give 
reason  to  model  periods  of  turbulence  using  Markov  switching.    By  endogenously 
identifying  the  ordinary  and  turbulent  periods  these  problems  are  avoided.  Another 
advantage of a Markov switching model according to Abiad (2003) and Mariano, Abiad, 
Gultekin, Shabbir & Tan (2003) is that, unlike in a binary or a threshold indicator, it 
utilizes all information contained in the exchange rate dynamics.  In addition, Jeanne & 
Masson (2000) provided a theoretical justification for the use of Markov switching in 
modeling currency crises where the jump in states corresponds to the policy maker’s 
decision rule induced by shifts in the speculator’s expectations.  Furthermore, Lee & 
Chen (2006) have shown that modeling FX rate movements using Markov switching is 
consistent with common exchange rate policies of most central banks. 
  The  Markov  switching  model  of  Hamilton  (1989,  1990)  gave  rise  to  the 
exploration of the dynamics of exchange rate movements and one area is the study of 
currency crises.  Engel & Hakkio (1996) modeled the EMS currencies using MSR with 
TVTP  where  they  considered  two  regimes,  the  stable  and  the  volatile,  as  a  mixture 
distribution of two normals.  Volatile periods occur during realignments of currencies in 
the EMS band where the transition probability depends on the location of the currency 
within the EMS band.  They have shown that the probability of realignment depends on 
what regime the period belongs to.     14 
In their study of the EMS crisis, Gomez-Puig & Montalvo (1997) classified the 
volatility of the exchange rate into stormy or stable states.  The stormy regime indicates 
low credibility and is associated with a change in state through realignment, while a 
stable  regime  means  credibility  where  a  change  in  state  is  not  associated  with 
realignment.    Their  MSR  with  FTP  model  seemed  to  capture  the  sudden  change  in 
expectations that gave rise to a self-fulfilling attack.  Cerra & Saxena (2002) on the other 
hand employed TVTP of the MSR model to show evidence of contagion in the Asian 
Financial Crisis where an ISP of Thailand and Korea driving the TVTP improved the 
estimation of the conditional probability of a crisis in Indonesia.  Similarly, Abiad (2003) 
and  Mariano,  Abiad,  Gultekin,  Shabbir  &  Tan  (2003)  used  an  MSR  with  TVTP  to 
develop an EWS using Markov switching of the change in nominal exchange rate with 
three  categories  of  early  warning  indicators.    Abiad’s  (2003)  indicators  involved 
macroeconomic, capital flow and financial fragility variables.  Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano 
& Tan (2008)  further sought  to  improve on the model of  Mariano, Abiad, Gultekin, 
Shabbir & Tan (2003) by factoring in a GARCH model in the conditional variance to 
account for large time-varying variances during periods of turbulence.  Brunetti, Scotti, 
Mariano & Tan (2008) also covered a wider class of crisis indicators which include the 
external sector, financial sector, real sector and the banking sector.  These indicators have 
supporting empirical evidence from the study of Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) on the 
Asian Financial Crisis. 
The use of MSVAR model for a currency crisis was first employed by Fratzscher 
(1999).  Using an MSVAR with FTP he investigated evidence of fundamentals, self-
fulfilling  and  contagion  basis  of  currency  crises  using  MSVAR  with  FTP.  While 
Martinez  Peria  (2002)  used  an  MSVAR  with  TVTP  to  identify  speculative  episodes 
during the EMS currencies from 1979-1993 where the ISP and the transition probabilities 
are functions of the fundamentals and expectations. 
2.3  Summary of Indicator Variables 
  Researchers of currency crises treat macroeconomic and other indicators in two 
different ways.  The first one is to use the indicators to explain the cause of the crises and 
the second one is to use the indicators to forecast the crises.  In the first group, the most 
notable papers consist of Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz (1994, 1995, 1996), Frankel &   15 
Rose (1996), Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996) and Tornell (1999).  In the second group, 
we have Kaminsky, Lizondo & Reinhart (1998), Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999, 2000), 
Abiad (2003), Mariano, Abiad, Gultekin, Shabbir & Tan (2003), Asian Development 
Bank (2005) which edited the papers of Zhuang (2005) and Koo, Oh, Joo, Lee & Tan 
(2005), and Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano & Tan (2008).  Table 2 presents a summary of the 
models and the different macroeconomic and leading indicators of currency crises. 
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Table 2.   Econometric Models, Dependent and Indicator Variables 
Author(s)  Model  Dependent Variable  Significant Indicators 
Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz 
(1994)  
None.  Kolmogorov-
Smirnov testing of an 
indicator’s difference in 
distributions between crisis 
and non-crisis periods. 
ISP for identifying 
periods of speculative 
attack. 
 
Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz 
(1995) 
Multinomial Logit  ISP dummy 
exceeding threshold 
past government election loss, 
future controls, CA 
Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz 
(1996) 
Probit Model  ISP dummy 
exceeding threshold 
crisis elsewhere dummy, 
inflation, unemployment rate, 
capital accounts to GDP ratio, 
capital controls, incumbent 
government election victory 
Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996)  Cross-country Regression  ISP  real exchange rate, M2 to FX 
reserve ratio, bank lending to 
private sector to GDP ratio 
Frankel & Rose (1996)  Cross-country Probit 
Regression 
ISP  real ER, CA deficit, fiscal 
deficit, debt composition, 
external variables, ratio of FDI 
to debt, reserves to import 
ratio, domestic credit growth, 
economic growth rate, foreign 
interest rate 
Kaminsky, Lizondo & Reinhart 
(1998) 
Signals Approach  No dependent 
variable.  Each 
indicator in the last 
column is tested 
whether exceeding a 
threshold signals a 
crisis in the next 24 
months. 
exports, real effective ER, M2 
to FX reserve ratio, output, 
equity prices 
Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999)  Signals Approach  ISP to identify 
turbulent periods.  No 
dependent variable.  
Each indicator to the 
right is tested 
whether exceeding a 
threshold signals a 
crisis in the next 24 
months. 
M2 multiplier, growth of 
domestic credit to GDP ratio, 
real interest rate, lending to 
deposit ratio, excess M1 
balances, M2 to FX reserve 
ratio, bank deposit growth, 
export growth, terms of trade, 
real ER, growth in FX reserve, 
output growth, stock price 
returns, ratio of fiscal deficit to 
GDP 
Cerra & Saxena (2002)  MSR with TVTP  ISP  lagged ISP of other countries 
Martinez Peria (2002)  MSVAR with TVTP  ISP components 
ΔER, ΔFR and ΔID 
fiscal deficit 
Abiad (2003)  MSR with TVTP  Month-on-month % 
change in nominal 
ER 
real effective ER, CA to GDP 
ratio, export growth, M2 to FX 
reserve ratio, growth of M2 to 
FX reserve ratio, FX reserve 
growth, real GDP growth, 
growth in industrial production, 
domestic credit growth, central 
bank credit to the banking 
sector, M2 to deposit ratio, 
growth of M2 to deposit ratio, 
stock market performance, 
share of non-FDI flows to total 
capital flows, real interest rate, 
LIBOR 
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Table 2.   Econometric Models, Dependent and Indicator Variables (cont’d.) 
Author(s)  Model  Dependent Variable  Significant Indicators 
Mariano, Abiad, Gultekin, Shabbir 
& Tan (2003) 
MSR with TVTP  Month-on-month % 
change in nominal 
ER 
real effective ER, M2 to FX 
reserve ratio, real domestic 
credit 
Zhuang (2005)  Signals Approach  No dependent 
variable.  Each 
indicator in the last 
column is tested 
whether exceeding a 
threshold signals a 
crisis in the next 24 
months. 
real effective ER, ratio of short-
term external debt to FX 
reserve, ratio of deposits in BIS 
banks to FX reserve, M2 to FX 
reserve ratio, year-on-year 
change in short-term capital 
flows to GDP ratio, CA to GDI 
ratio, year-on-year change in 
real commercial bank deposits 
Koo, Oh, Joo, Lee & Tan (2005)  Cross-country Panel LDV  Two standard 
deviations from the 
mean of the change 
in nominal ER 
real effective ER, export 
growth, ratio of CA to GDP, 
ratio of short-term external debt 
to GDP, growth in FX reserve 
Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano & Tan 
(2008) 
MSR-GARCH with TVTP  Month-on-month 
change in log of 
nominal ER 
real effective ER, M2 to FX 
reserve ratio, banking index 
returns, banking index return 
volatility, general stock market 
index return 
 
III.  Markov Switching VAR Model with Time-Varying Transition Probabilities 
 
The following MSVAR model with TVTP is an extension of the MSVAR with 
FTP by Krolzig (1997).  While MSVAR models of Krolzig (1997) and Bellone (2005) 
covered extensively the different structures of the variance-covariance matrix of the error 
vector in this study the approach of Martinez Peria (2002) is adapted so that the MSVAR 
is Cholesky transformed where the variance-covariance matrix is effectively diagonal.  
This was done to simplify the estimation of the likelihood function with the focus on the 
TVTP equation. 
3.1  Time-Varying Transition Probabilities 
  Two  states  are  considered  here.    The  turbulent  state  represents  periods  of 
speculative  pressure.    This  state  covers  both  speculative  attack  periods  that  result  in 
reduction  of  FX reserves  and  periods of  crisis.   As  Brunetti,  Scotti,  Mariano  & Tan 
(2008)  have  observed,  the  turbulent  period  need  not  be  a  crisis  period.    When  the 
monetary authorities are able to handle the speculative attack, the turbulence need not 
turn into a currency crisis.  Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano & Tan (2008), including Abiad 
(2003) and Mariano, Abiad, Gultekin, Shabbir & Tan (2003), employed a probit form of   18 
the  transition  probabilities.  In  this  study,  a  logistic  functional  form  of  the  TVTP  is 
specified and shown below. 
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  The  equations  of  the  transition  probabilities  above  indicate  that  the  transition 
probabilities are one-period forecasts, ex post. 
3.2  Markov Switching Vector Autoregression 
The underlying regime in Equation (2) drives the mean equation that is specified 
by an MSVAR model  
      t t t t t t S y S S y        1 0 , where    I N t , 0 ~  .      (7) 
The  t y  is a vector of endogenous variables consisting of the change in nominal exchange 
rate  t t ER y   , 1 , the change in foreign reserve  t t FR y   , 2  and the  change in  interest 
differentials  t t ID y   , 3 .  The covariance matrix, which is an identity matrix I , of  t   can 
be replaced with  t   which is a diagonal matrix consisting of univariate GARCH models.  
This is an  extension to MSVAR from MSR-GARCH with TVTP of  Brunetti, Scotti, 
Mariano & Tan (2008).  The scalar specification of the standard deviation    t S   comes 
from  the  equalization  of  the  standard  deviation  of  the  ISP  components  similar  to 
Eichengreen,  Rose  &  Wyplosz  (1994,  199 5,  1996),  Frankel  &  Rose  (1996)  and 
Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999).  This equalization technically results in equal  t , 1  ,  t , 2   
and  t , 3   in a given regime of the  t y -vector components.   19 
By applying a Cholesky transformation to  t y  the MSVAR model ends up with the 
following, 
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  As Martinez Peria (2002) noted, since there is a one-to-one relationship between 
the  triangular  and  non-triangular  versions  of  the  VAR,  and  because  the  transition 
probability models are the same for both normalizations, the estimates are unaffected.  To 
show this relationship, Equation (8) is re-expressed back to Equation (7). 
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The conditional density of each element of  t y  is given below.   20 
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The conditional density of the MSVAR is 
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where 
  3 2 1 , ,      , 
  3 2 1 , ,      , and 
  t t t y y z , 2 , 1 ,  . 
 
The complete-data likelihood is 
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    (16) 
where 
*
T y , 
*
T S , 
*
T z  and 
*
T x  refer to all observations from  1  t  to  T t   of  t y ,  t S ,  t z  and 
t x , respectively, and the incomplete-data loglikelihood is   21 
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Since, all variables in this model estimation are stationary,    is not a parameter but is 
initialized and determined by  . 
  Using  the  EM  algorithm  for  MSR  with  TVTP  by  Diebold,  Lee  &  Weinbach 
(1994), which is  based  on Hamilton’s (1990) EM  algorithm for  MSR  with  FTP,  the 
incomplete-data loglikelihood is maximized to estimate the parameters. 
3.3  Index of Speculative Pressure from MSVAR with TVTP 
From Equation (1), the ISP in each regime is 
     
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







    (18) 
from which the expected ISP is derived and given by 
        2 2 1 1 1 1           t t t t t t t t t S ISP S P S ISP S P ISP      (19) 
where  
 
21 11
1 1 t t t t p p S P                    (20) 
and 
 
12 22
1 2 t t t t p p S P      .              (21) 
The 
11
t p , 
12
t p , 
22
t p  and 
21
t p  are the transition probabilities specified in Equations (3) to 
(6), respectively, and are all conditional on information up to  1  t , that is,  1  t . 
  There are two ways of defining a crisis probability.  The first one is the 
probability of a turbulent regime    1  t S P , that is, 
    1 1 1       t t t t S P Crisis P             (22) 
and the second one is   22 
    1 1       t t t t ISP P Crisis P              (23) 
where   is a threshold below which the ISP indicates that a currency crisis has occurred.  
The crisis forecasts of these two approaches are compared. 
 
IV.  Results and Discussion 
 
  The MSVAR with TVTP in this study is adapted from Martinez Peria’s (2002) 
model.  The difference with this study and her paper was on the application.  First, the 
objective  of  Martinez  Peria  (2002)  in  estimating  the  MSVAR  model  was  for  dating 
periods of speculative pressure in the EMS countries while in this study the purpose is to 
identify leading indicators of speculative pressure for  the four  Asian Financial Crisis 
countries:    Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines  and  Thailand.    Second,  Martinez  Peria 
(2002) pooled the data for all the European countries in her analysis of the EMS crisis.  
She obtained this pooled data by stacking the data for each country and estimating one 
MSVAR with TVTP for all countries at once while including country dummies to control 
for country fixed effects.  The country dummies turned out to be jointly significant but 
individually insignificant.  In this study, the MSVAR with TVTP model is estimated for 
each country separately.  This approach is along the lines of Abiad (2003), Mariano, 
Abiad, Gultekin, Shabbir & Tan (2003) and Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano & Tan (2008) who 
noted the idiosyncrasies of each country facing periods of speculative pressure.  Different 
country characteristics imply different currency vulnerabilities.  Abiad (2003) and the 
other studies, for example, found that countries have varying significant early warning 
indicators of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
  The three measures of speculative pressure are the month-on-month percentage 
change in the nominal exchange rate  ER  , and the foreign exchange reserve  FR   and 
the month-on-month change in the interest rate differential  ID   between a country and 
the U.S.  The monthly data from 1980 to 1999 data were sourced from Abiad’s (2003) 
dataset including the early warning indicators. 
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4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
   Table  3  shows  that  the  three  measures  of  speculative  pressure  have  large 
differences in magnitude.  The change in FX reserve is the most volatile among the three 
except for Indonesia where it is the change in exchange rate.  It is also evident that the 
least volatile is the change in interest rate differential.  These are shown in Figures 1.1, 
2.1, 3.1 and 4.1 for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, respectively.  The 
large differences in magnitude obscure the impact of the changes in the ISP components.  
In econometric modeling the standard deviations of  ER  ,  FR   and  ID   are equalized 
in order to remove these differences in magnitude.  This approach is given in Equation 
(1).  This approach was taken by Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz (1994, 1995, 1996), 
Frankel & Rose  (1996), Sachs, Tornell  & Velasco (1996) and Kaminsky  & Reinhart 
(1999).  The base is the standard deviation of  ID   for Indonesia while it is  ER   for 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.  Figures 1.2, 2.2, 3.2 and 4.2 show the effect of 
equalizing the standard deviations.  While  ID   seems muted in Figures 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 and 
4.1 during periods of speculative pressure the equalization reveals in Figures 1.2, 2.2, 3.2 
and 4.2 that this is not so.  
The turbulent episodes are shown by the shaded portions of Figures 1 to 4.  These 
are according to Abiad’s (2003) classification of periods of speculative pressure based on 
a three standard deviation from the mean of the ISP.  In these periods, the currencies 
experienced depreciations or devaluations.  If small depreciations are observed during 
periods of speculative pressure there are correspondingly huge changes in the FX reserve 
reflecting drawdowns by the monetary authority to defend its currency.  There are also 
large positive changes in interest rate differentials.  Raising the domestic interest rate is 
another tool a government employs to stem the impact of speculation thereby raising the 
interest differentials.  This is clearly the case for Indonesia in the early 1980s where there 
was a huge drop in FX reserves at the beginning of the period of speculative attack with 
no devaluation yet and no change in interest differential.  The devaluation of the rupiah 
came  afterwards.  Malaysia  experienced  a  similar  occurrence  in  the  early  1980s  and 
1990s where the ringgit only depreciated after reduction in FX reserve and increase in 
interest rates.  In the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, Philippines’ had decreases in FX 
reserves before the depreciation of the peso with further reduction in reserves during the   24 
mid-1980s.  A similar pattern happened in Thailand in the 1980s where the FX reserves 
contracted first before the baht devalued.  
   During the Asian Financial Crisis all three components of the ISP responded to 
speculative attacks as governments attempted but failed to preserve the crawling pegs of 
the four countries.  The drawdowns from the FX reserve and the monetary tightening to 
stabilize  the  devaluated  currency  all  reflected  the  defensive  moves  in  response  to 
speculative pressure.  The baht floated in July 1997 after the unsustainable losses in FX 
reserve by Thailand coupled with interest rate hikes.  Indonesia allowed its rupiah to 
devalue in the early period of the crisis but still incurred huge losses in FX reserves on a 
month-on-month basis while at the same time it raised interest rate to ease pressures on 
its currency.  Malaysia’s FX reserves also contracted and its interest rates went up to 
defend the ringgit.  Eventually the ringgit was devalued.  While the Philippines allowed 
the peso to severely devalue after providing brief support through its FX reserve and 
through interest rate hikes. 
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Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics 
Country  Statistics  ΔER  ΔFR  ΔID 
    Mean  -1.390  1.020  0.029 
    Median  -0.319  0.757  0.000 
IND   Maximum  29.439  30.903  12.000 
    Minimum  -123.118  -33.771  -7.950 
    Std. Dev.  10.344  6.880  1.728 
    Skewness  -7.666  0.042  1.780 
    Kurtosis  84.964  7.155  19.724 
    Mean  0.264  1.031  -0.009 
    Median  0.004  0.849  0.000 
MAL   Maximum  17.357  36.559  1.500 
    Minimum  -19.560  -18.366  -3.330 
    Std. Dev.  2.590  5.979  0.446 
    Skewness  0.133  1.023  -2.550 
    Kurtosis  27.742  8.503  18.854 
    Mean  0.771  2.441  -0.011 
    Median  0.107  0.511  -0.006 
PHI   Maximum  28.567  108.838  6.015 
    Minimum  -8.133  -51.294  -3.934 
    Std. Dev.  3.734  20.264  1.256 
    Skewness  3.940  2.140  0.642 
    Kurtosis  27.116  11.008  6.483 
    Mean  0.306  1.389  -0.022 
    Median  0.000  1.466  0.000 
THA   Maximum  24.335  30.912  3.000 
    Minimum  -21.853  -16.612  -3.250 
    Std. Dev.  3.313  5.845  0.593 
    Skewness  2.077  0.560  -0.728 
    Kurtosis  29.871  6.954  13.742 
Note:  ER is in country currency per U.S. dollar.  ΔER = -(ERt – ERt-1)/ERt-1 in %, so that a negative ΔER means 
depreciation.  For example, IND rupiah jumped to IDR 10,375 per dollar in January 1998 from IDR 4,650 in 
December 1997, a change of 123.118%.  This means that ΔER = -123.118%.  ΔFR = (FRt – FRt-1)/FRt-1 in %.   
ΔID = (IDt – IDt-1)/IDt-1 in %, where ID = Country interest rate minus U.S. interest rate. 
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Figure 1.1.  Changes in Exchange Rate, FX Reserve and Interest Differential:   
      Indonesia 
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Figure 1.2.  Standardized Changes in Exchange Rate, FX Reserve and Interest Differential:  
      Indonesia  
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Figure 2.1.  Changes in Exchange Rate, FX Reserve and Interest Differential:   
      Malaysia 
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Figure 2.2.  Standardized Changes in Exchange Rate, FX Reserve and Interest Differential:   
        Malaysia  
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Figure 3.1.  Changes in Exchange Rate, FX Reserve and Interest Differential:  
      Philippines 
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Figure 3.2.  Standardized Changes in Exchange Rate, FX Reserve and Interest Differential:   
        Philippines  
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Figure 4.1.  Changes in Exchange Rate, FX Reserve and Interest Differential:   
      Thailand 
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Figure 4.2.  Standardized Changes in Exchange Rate, FX Reserve and Interest Differential:   
        Thailand  
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4.2  Macroeconomic Indicators 
The overvaluation of the currency is reflected in the real effective exchange rate 
(REER), the ratio of the current account balance with the GDP (NEGCA/GDP) and the 
export growth rate (NEGEXPORTG) which all go back to Sachs, Tornell & Velasco 
(1996) and Krugman (1996).  The adequacy of the reserves is measured by the M2 ratio 
with  the  foreign  exchange  reserve  (NEGM2RATIO)  and  its  growth  rate 
(NEGM2RATIOG).  As Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996) had discussed, this reflects 
how well the monetary authorities are able to cover the demand for foreign exchange 
during periods of panic where investors dump the local currency.  The overexpansion of 
domestic credit (RDC) led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 according 
to Blackburn & Sola (1993).  The RDC was similarly explained by Sachs, Tornell & 
Velasco (1996) in their investigation of the EMS and Tequila crises.  The slowdown in 
overall economic activity, represented by the change in the real gross domestic product 
growth  (NEGGDP)  interpolated  from  quarterly  data,  is  another  factor  that  reflects 
vulnerability  of  the  currency.    The  ratio  of  cumulative  non-FDI  flows  with  GDP 
(NFDIFLW)  is  an  indicator  of  movement  of  hot  money  that  becomes  a  source  of 
weakness for the currency when there is flight of capital as an outcome of the bursting of 
an asset price bubble.  Another source of vulnerability would be the potential capital flow 
reversal as reflected in the LIBOR.  The weakness of the banking system was identified 
by Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) as another cause of a currency crisis.  A measure of such 
weakness is the extent of bailout of ailing banks by the government through the ratio of 
central bank credit to banks’ total bank liabilities (CBBAIL).  Similarly, the confidence 
of the depositors as measured by the ratio of total bank deposits to M2 (NEGDEPM2) 
and its change (NEGDEPM2G) serve as indicator of the stability of the banking system. 
In  Table  4  the  potential  early  warning  indicators  are  presented.    Some  were 
reversed  in  sign  so  that  the  TVTP 
11
t p   logistic  regression  would  have  an  expected 
positive regressor coefficient.  This means that the indicator influences the probability of 
remaining in a turbulent regime.  Pre-screening was done based on Abiad’s (2003) simple 
linear regressions.  Furthermore, each indicator is evaluated and selected depending on 
how well each is able to provide early signals of periods of speculative pressure where a 
signal  is  marked  when 
1
t p   goes  above  50%.   After  which  the  best  combination  of   35 
variables are chosen in the final model for each country.  Table  5a and 5b report the 
parameter  estimates  of  the  TVTP  equation,  however,  the  parameter  estimates  of  the 
MSVAR model in two states were omitted since the primary interest here is to identify 
the indicators of the probability of a crisis occurring.   Only the parameter estimates of 
the final MSVAR model are reported. 
 
Table 4.   Variable Description 
Classification  Indicator  Value Interpretation 
Real Overvaluation  REER  (+) overvalued; deviating  above trend 
Trade Balance  NEGCA/GDP  (+) deficit 
  NEGEXPORTG  (+) contraction in growth 
FX Reserve Adequacy   NEGM2RATIO  higher (+) value, less adequate 
   NEGM2RATIOG  getting more inadequate 
Credit Overexpansion  RDC  (+) overexpansion 
Real Economy  NEGIP  (+) contraction in growth 
   NEGGDP  (+) contraction in growth 
Short-term Capital Flow  NFDIFLW  (+) higher flows 
Capital Flow Reversal  LIBOR  (+) higher potential flow reversal 
Central Bank Bailout   CBBAIL  higher (+) value, more bailout 
Bank Confidence  NEGDEPM2  less (-), less confident 
   NEGDEPM2G  getting less confident 
 
4.3  Indonesia 
  Among the early warning indicators examined, Table 5.1 presents the ones that 
provide a reasonable identification of periods of speculative pressure based on 
11
t p  and 
1
t p .  The variables that were initially on the list are REER, NEGEXPORTG, CBBAIL 
and NEGDEPM2G.  Although only real effective exchange rate and export growth are 
significant the good fit of 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  during periods of speculative pressure suggests that 
the central bank bailout and growth of the deposit to money supply ratio are potential 
indicators as well.  The four indicators imply that the overvaluation of the currency after 
many  years  of  fixed  exchange  rate  of  the  rupiah  with  the  dollar, with  corresponding 
outcome  of  loss  of  competitiveness  resulting  in  contracting  exports ,  is  a  potential 
indicator of an impending currency crisis.  Central bank credit to the banking system is 
another  indicator  of  potential  vulnerability  when  the  system  is  under  stress.  This  is 
consistent with the costly bank bailouts in Indonesia during the Asian Financial Crisis.    36 
The  confidence  of  the  public  in  the  banking  system  suggests  another  signal  and  a 
potential source of vulnerability of the rupiah and the economy as a whole. 
 
Table 5.1.  TVTP indicators:  Indonesia and Malaysia 
     IND              MAL       
1  t S :  Turbulent                         
0   
4.1717  3.6401  4.4853  3.8392  2.7590  4.6477  1.9807  2.6721  3.3816 
(0.6528)  (0.5329)  (0.4801)  (0.6254)  (3.2537)  (9.1803)  (0.4100)  (0.4939)  (1.8254) 
1   :   
REER 
0.9566         1.7961          
(0.3273)         (2.2576)          
1   :   
NEGCA/GDP 
                    
                    
1   :   
NEGEXPORTG 
   0.7672                 
   (0.4620)                 
1   :   
NEGM2RATIO 
                    
                    
1   :   
NEGM2RATIOG 
                    
                    
1   :   
RDC 
            2.8067        
            (7.6623)        
1   :   
NEGGDP 
              0.4250      
              (0.4197)      
1   :   
LIBOR 
                0.3455    
                (0.6628)    
1   :   
NFDIFLW 
                    
                    
1   :   
CBBAIL 
     0.0415               
     (0.3801)               
1   :   
NEGDEPM2 
                  0.6726 
                  (3.2600) 
1   :   
NEGDEPM2G 
       -0.1567            
         (0.4633)                
2  t S :  Ordinary                         
0     
0.6795  -0.2277  0.1045  -0.0800  2.8916  1.6131  -1.3345  -1.4183  2.4156 
(0.5341)  (0.4522)  (0.4628)  (0.4742)  (2.1504)  (2.4199)  (0.5495)  (0.6476)  (1.2993) 
                             
LogL   -1798.6  -1808.7  -1824.7  -1829.0  -2509.0  -2479.6  -2221.0  -2271.1  -2394.2 
 AIC  15.4086  15.4931  15.6274  15.6636  21.3780  21.1309  18.9577  19.3787  20.4131 
 SIC  15.9192  16.0037  16.1380  16.1742  21.8887  21.6416  19.4684  19.8893  20.9237 
 HQ  15.6144  15.6989  15.8332  15.8694  21.5838  21.3367  19.1635  19.5845  20.6189 
Note:  Standard error in parenthesis.  Highlighted coefficient estimates are significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 6 presents the final MSVAR model for Indonesia.  The common standard 
deviation  of  the  error  terms,    t S  ,  during  turbulent  periods  is  higher  than  during   37 
ordinary periods.  This is consistent with the results of Abiad (2003) and Mariano, Abiad, 
Gultekin, Shabbir & Tan (2003).  The three indicators:  real effective exchange rate, 
export growth and growth of the deposit to money supply ratio are all significant. 
Although the fit of only either REER or NEGEXPORTG is better based on the 
loglikelihood  compared  to  the  three  indicators  REER,  NEGEXPORTG  and 
NEGDEPM2G  taken  together  in  the  TVTP  equation,  the  individual  indicator  in  the 
former contain too many false signals in the transition probabilities 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  compared 
to the combination of the three in the latter.  This supports the choice of the final model 
in Table 6 as the best one.  The final model provides signal of the Asian Financial Crisis 
as  early  as November  and  December  1996  with  92%  although  the  signal eventually 
diminished and only jumped up again to 77% in July 1997, the onset of the crisis. 
Figures  5  and  6,  based  on  estimated  values of  the  transition  probabilities  in 
Equations  (3),  (6),  (20)  and  (22),  show  that  the  model  adequately  accounted  for  the 
turbulence in the rupiah during the Asian Financial Crisis.  However, there were signals 
of speculative pressure in Figure 6 during the 1980s which are not crisis episodes, but had 
large fluctuations in the FX reserves.  This indicates that the MSVAR with TVTP is very 
sensitive to relatively volatile periods of even one of the ISP components.  Figures 1.1 
and 1.2 show that there were large changes in FX reserves in the early 1980s and in 
between  the  mid-1980s  to  early  1990s  and  these  were  reflected  in  the  transition 
probabilities in Figures 5 and 6.  This also means that a turbulent period need not be a 
crisis  and  still  is  detected  by  the  MSVAR  with  TVTP  model.  This  sensitiveness  to 
changes in the regime of the ISP indicators enables one to use this model for short-term 
forecasting of speculative pressure episodes. 
  In Figures 7 and 8, the ISP derived from the MSVAR with TVTP model and 
specified  in  Equations  (19),  (20),  (21)  and  (23)  is  presented.   The  ISP  shows  large 
fluctuations  during  turbulent  periods  for  the  Indonesian  rupiah,  especially  during  the 
Asian Financial Crisis.  The crisis period identified by the ISP is based on ISP values 
lower  than  the  threshold  ISP ISP    5 . 1   .    The  choice  of  1.5  times  the  standard 
deviation is the same as in Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz (1994).  The reason for this 
choice, instead of the typical factor of 2 or 3, is that this cut-off provides a good balance 
between identifying a crisis episode from a non-crisis one.   38 
  Comparing Figures 6 and 8, which correspond respectively to Equations (22) and 
(23),  reveals  that    1 1    t t S P   produces  more  false  signals  than    1    t t ISP P  .  
However,    1    t t ISP P    cannot  serve  as  a  forecasting  approach  for  the  Indonesian 
rupiah because it largely detected a crisis episode after it already occurred, including the 
Asian Financial Crisis. 
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Table 5.2.  TVTP indicators:  Philippines and Thailand 
        PHI           THA    
1  t S :  Turbulent                      
0   
5.9278  3.1199  4.6331  3.2339  5.4327  2.0211  2.4069  2.0661 
(5.8530)  (0.8262)  (25.0731)  (4.6175)  (0.9002)  (2.9175)  (3.2388)  (2.7358) 
1   :   
REER 
1.0769           1.4592      
(2.9104)           (2.3290)      
1   :   
NEGCA/GDP 
                 
                 
1   :   
NEGEXPORTG 
  0.4247               
  (0.7499)               
1   :   
NEGM2RATIO 
    0.7391             
    (40.4858)             
1   :   
NEGM2RATIOG 
      0.9822           
      (5.6662)           
1   :   
RDC 
                 
                 
1   :   
NEGGDP 
             2.8699    
             (8.1939)    
1   :   
LIBOR 
                 
                 
1   :   
NFDIFLW 
               1.2281 
               (2.7595) 
1   :   
CBBAIL 
                 
                 
1   :   
NEGDEPM2 
                 
                 
1   :   
NEGDEPM2G 
        -0.1197        
            (0.8034)          
2  t S :  Ordinary                      
0   
0.9471  -1.0664  0.7599  2.9018  -0.4958  1.8362  1.4488  1.6271 
(0.8559)  (0.9854)  (2.1186)  (2.5263)  (0.8850)  (2.8679)  (3.0278)  (2.5709) 
                          
LogL   -3174.6  -3178.9  -3324.8  -3380.1  -3161.4  -3340.9  -3311.8  -3330.2 
 AIC  26.9718  27.0072  28.2334  28.6985  26.8607  28.3690  28.1240  28.2788 
 SIC  27.4824  27.5178  28.7440  29.2091  27.3713  28.8796  28.6346  28.7894 
 HQ  27.1776  27.2130  28.4392  28.9043  27.0664  28.5748  28.3298  28.4846 
Note:  Standard error in parenthesis.  Highlighted coefficient estimates are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6.  MSVAR Model:  Indonesia 
   ΔER  ΔFR  ΔID        TVTP   
1  t S :  Turbulent          1  t S : Turbulent       
0   
 
-0.2690  0.1309  -0.0281    0    
  
4.6300    
(0.1276)  (0.0772)  (0.0901)    (0.6694)    
F
i1   
 
0.0798  0.0369  -0.1353   
1  : REER 
 
0.9754    
(0.0334)  (0.0519)  (0.0620)    (0.5841)    
F
i2   
 
0.1072  -0.0698  -0.0309   
2  : NEGEXPORTG 
 
1.3444    
(0.0581)  (0.0371)  (0.0597)    (0.5835)    
F
i3   
 
0.0856  -0.0560  0.3347      3  : NEGDEPM2G  
 
0.8783    
(0.0607)  (0.0894)  (0.0212)    (0.4414)    
4 j   
 
   -0.0340  -0.0594    2  t S : Ordinary       
   (0.0670)  (0.0604)    0   
   
0.0223    
5 k   
 
     0.1171    (0.5326)    
      (0.0931)               
2  t S :  Ordinary          LogL     -1819.2    
0   
 
0.1549  0.4756  0.0069    AIC     15.5982    
(0.1067)  (0.0645)  (0.1461)    SIC     16.1380    
F
i1   
 
2.8777  1.2632  1.2627    HQ     15.8158    
(0.9153)  (0.7289)  (2.2036)           
F
i2   
 
0.1716  -0.0448  0.0609           
(0.0895)  (0.0436)  (0.0937)           
F
i3   
 
-0.1067  0.3010  0.6617           
(0.1336)  (0.0899)  (0.1389)           
4 j   
 
   -0.0187  -0.7941           
   (0.4839)  (1.4441)           
5 k   
 
     -0.0980           
      (0.1640)           
1  t S :  Turbulent                 
  
 
   1.7655              
   (0.0338)              
2  t S : Ordinary                  
  
 
   0.1392              
   (0.0122)              
Note:  Standard error in parenthesis.  Highlighted coefficient estimates are significant at the 10% level..        3 , 3 , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1    k j i . 
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Table 7.  Transition Probabilities:  Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
  Time  p11  p21  p1 
1996M01  0.0022  0.0419  0.0441 
1996M02  0.0440  0.4604  0.5044 
1996M03  0.0236  0.0001  0.0237 
1996M04  0.0046  0.0005  0.0052 
1996M05  0.0002  0.0002  0.0004 
1996M06  0.0002  0.0007  0.0009 
1996M07  0.0002  0.0003  0.0005 
1996M08  0.0003  0.0013  0.0016 
1996M09  0.0016  0.0101  0.0116 
1996M10  0.0115  0.0595  0.0710 
1996M11  0.0710  0.8482  0.9192 
1996M12  0.9154  0.0071  0.9225 
1997M01  0.2287  0.0000  0.2287 
1997M02  0.0109  0.0000  0.0109 
1997M03  0.0015  0.0000  0.0015 
1997M04  0.0013  0.0004  0.0017 
1997M05  0.0017  0.0047  0.0064 
1997M06  0.0064  0.0318  0.0382 
1997M07  0.0382  0.7343  0.7725 
1997M08  0.7725  0.2275  1.0000 
1997M09  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1997M10  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1997M11  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1997M12  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M01  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M02  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M03  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M04  0.9937  0.0000  0.9937 
1998M05  0.9937  0.0063  1.0000 
1998M06  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M07  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M08  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M09  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M10  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M11  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M12  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1999M01  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1999M02  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1999M03  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1999M04  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1999M05  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1999M06  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000   42 
Figure 5.  Transition Probabilities:  Indonesia 
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Figure 6.  Probability of Crisis    1 1    t t S P :  Indonesia 
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Figure 7.  Index of Speculative Pressure:  Indonesia 
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Figure 8.  Probability of Crisis    1    t t ISP P  :  Indonesia 
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4.4  Malaysia 
  The early warning indicators that provided reasonable predictions of the periods 
of speculative pressure in Malaysia are given in Table 5.1.  The variables in this list are 
REER,  RDC,  NEGGDP,  LIBOR  and  NEGDEPM2.  Overvaluation  of  the  currency, 
excessive lending by financial institutions, contracting economy, capital flow reversal 
and confidence in banks are potential indicators of vulnerability that can lead to periods 
of turbulence in the ringgit.  Although there are no individual significant indicators, the 
good  fit  of 
11
t p   and 
1
t p   during  periods  of  speculative  pressure  suggests  that  these 
indicators remain useful. 
Table 8 presents the final MSVAR model for Malaysia.  The common standard 
deviation  of  the  error  terms,    t S  ,  during  turbulent  periods  is  higher  than  during 
ordinary periods.  The three indicators:  real effective exchange rate, real domestic credit 
growth and GDP growth result in a good fit of 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  during periods of speculative 
pressure.  Figures 9 and 10 show that the model has adequately signaled the turbulent 
periods of the ringgit including early signals for the Asian Financial Crisis and during the 
1980s. 
Although  the  fit  of  only  either RDC,  NEGGDP,  LIBOR  and  NEGDEPM2  is 
better  based  on  the  loglikelihood  compared  to  the  three  indicators  REER, RDC  and 
NEGGDP taken together in the TVTP equation, the individual indicator in the former 
contain too many false signals in the transition probabilities 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  compared to the 
combination of the three in the latter.  This lends support to the final model in Table 8.  
The final model provides signal of the Asian Financial Crisis as early as April 1997 with 
more than 58% and has increasing probability until July 1997. 
  In Figures 11 and 12, the ISP derived from the MSVAR with TVTP model is 
presented.  The ISP shows large fluctuations during turbulent periods for the Malaysian 
ringgit,  especially  during  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis.   Similar  to  Indonesia,  the  crisis 
period identified by the ISP is based on ISP values lower than  ISP ISP   5 . 1  .  Comparing 
Figures 10 and 12, which correspond respectively to Equations (22) and (23), reveals that 
  1 1    t t S P   produces  better  forecasting  signals  than    1    t t ISP P  .    While  the   45 
  1 1    t t S P  is able to detect crisis episodes ahead of time, the    1    t t ISP P   cannot 
and only signals a crisis when it has already occurred. 
4.5  Philippines 
  The potential indicators of periods of speculative pressure in the Philippines are 
given  in  Table  5.2.    These  are  REER,  NEGEXPORTG,  NEGM2RATIO, 
NEGM2RATIOG  and  NEGDEPM2G.  Overvaluation  of  the  currency,  contraction  in 
export, inadequacy of the FX reserve to fund conversions, slowdown in economic activity 
and  confidence  in  the  banking  sector  are  potential  indicators  of  the  currency  crisis.  
Although there are no significant individual indicators, the good fit of 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  during 
turbulent periods suggests that they remain useful.   
Table 10 presents  the final MSVAR model for the Philippines.  The common 
standard  deviation  of  the  error  terms,    t S  ,  during  turbulent  periods  is  higher  than 
during  ordinary  periods.    The  three  indicators:    real  effective  exchange  rate, export 
growth and adequateness of FX reserve to fund conversions result in a good fit of 
11
t p  
and 
1
t p  during periods of speculative pressure.  Figures 13 and 14 show that the model 
has adequately signaled the turbulent periods of the peso including early signals for the 
Asian Financial Crisis including during the early 1980s and 1990s. 
Although  the  fit  of  only  either  REER,  NEGEXPORTG,  NEGM2RATIO, 
NEGM2RATIOG and NEGDEPM2G is better based on the loglikelihood compared to 
the three indicators REER, NEGEXPORTG and NEGM2RATIOG taken together in the 
TVTP equation, the individual indicator in the former contain too many false signals in 
the transition probabilities 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  compared to the combination of the three in the 
latter.  This makes the choice of the final model in Table 10 as the best one.  The final 
model provides signal of the Asian Financial Crisis as early as February 1997 with more 
than 54% and has increasing probability until July 1997. 
  Similar to Malaysia and Indonesia, in Figures 15 and 16 the ISP derived from the 
MSVAR with TVTP model is plotted.  The ISP shows large fluctuations during turbulent 
periods for the Philippine peso, especially at the time of political turmoil in the early to 
mid-1980s and during the Asian Financial Crisis.  The crisis period identified by the ISP   46 
is also based on ISP values lower than  ISP ISP   5 . 1  .  Comparing Figures 14 and 16, 
which  correspond  respectively  to  Equations  (22)  and  (23),  reveals  that    1 1    t t S P  
produces better forecasting signals than    1    t t ISP P  .  The    1 1    t t S P  is able to 
indicate way ahead a currency crisis unlike the    1    t t ISP P   which only provided a 
signal  close  towards  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis  beginning  July  1997 .    A  similar 
observation is made that while the    1 1    t t S P  is able to detect crisis episodes ahead of 
time, the    1    t t ISP P   cannot and only signals a crisis when it has already occurred. 
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Table 8.  MSVAR Model:  Malaysia 
   ΔER  ΔFR  ΔID        TVTP   
1  t S :  Turbulent          1  t S : Turbulent       
0   
 
-0.3316  0.4010  -0.0345    0    
   
3.0003    
(0.1433)  (0.1349)  (0.1312)    (6.2062)    
F
i1   
 
0.4303  -0.0691  -0.1473   
1  : REER 
   
1.7878    
(0.0298)  (0.0421)  (0.0747)    (6.9077)    
F
i2   
 
0.0757  0.0200  -0.0537   
2  : RDC 
   
2.2144    
(0.0429)  (0.0380)  (0.0722)    (6.8628)    
F
i3   
 
-0.0731  -0.1370  0.1615   
3  : NEGGDP 
   
2.1535    
(0.0670)  (0.0881)  (0.0326)    (7.4537)    
4 j   
 
   0.1696  0.0609    2  t S : Ordinary       
   (0.0483)  (0.0839)    0   
   
2.5650    
5 k   
 
     -0.1221    (2.4480)    
      (0.0607)               
2  t S :  Ordinary          LogL     -2492.7    
0   
 
-0.2069  0.3789  0.0551    AIC     21.2580    
(0.2565)  (0.1538)  (0.2122)    SIC     21.7978    
F
i1   
 
0.4047  -0.0271  -0.1135    HQ     21.4756    
(0.1454)  (0.1742)  (0.2754)           
F
i2   
 
0.0212  0.0203  -0.0245           
(0.1717)  (0.0752)  (0.1410)           
F
i3   
 
-0.0227  -0.1386  0.1661           
(0.2526)  (0.1187)  (0.1442)           
4 j   
 
   0.2393  0.0772           
   (0.1736)  (0.3401)           
5 k   
 
     -0.0930           
      (0.1437)           
1  t S :  Turbulent                 
  
 
   1.9653              
   (0.0519)              
2  t S : Ordinary                 
  
 
   1.6590              
   (0.0883)              
Note:  Standard error in parenthesis.  Highlighted coefficient estimates are significant at the 10% level..        3 , 3 , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1    k j i . 
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Table 9.  Transition Probabilities:  Malaysia 
 Time  p11  P21  p1 
1996M01  0.1100  0.0401  0.1501 
1996M02  0.0572  0.0261  0.0833 
1996M03  0.0385  0.0251  0.0636 
1996M04  0.0218  0.0162  0.0381 
1996M05  0.0334  0.0180  0.0514 
1996M06  0.0489  0.0196  0.0685 
1996M07  0.0668  0.0238  0.0907 
1996M08  0.0873  0.0283  0.1156 
1996M09  0.1124  0.0330  0.1455 
1996M10  0.1437  0.0389  0.1826 
1996M11  0.1810  0.0435  0.2245 
1996M12  0.2231  0.0531  0.2761 
1997M01  0.2754  0.0640  0.3394 
1997M02  0.3394  0.0664  0.4058 
1997M03  0.4058  0.0790  0.4848 
1997M04  0.4848  0.0962  0.5810 
1997M05  0.5810  0.1034  0.6844 
1997M06  0.6844  0.1279  0.8123 
1997M07  0.8123  0.1498  0.9622 
1997M08  0.9622  0.0378  1.0000 
1997M09  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1997M10  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1997M11  0.9928  0.0000  0.9928 
1997M12  0.9928  0.0072  1.0000 
1998M01  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M02  0.7467  0.0000  0.7467 
1998M03  0.7450  0.0652  0.8103 
1998M04  0.8101  0.0836  0.8937 
1998M05  0.8936  0.0633  0.9569 
1998M06  0.9568  0.0321  0.9890 
1998M07  0.9884  0.0037  0.9921 
1998M08  0.9920  0.0054  0.9974 
1998M09  0.9974  0.0026  1.0000 
1998M10  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M11  0.9999  0.0000  0.9999 
1998M12  0.9999  0.0000  0.9999 
1999M01  0.9997  0.0000  0.9997 
1999M02  0.9959  0.0000  0.9959 
1999M03  0.9922  0.0008  0.9929 
1999M04  0.9851  0.0018  0.9869 
1999M05  0.8376  0.0005  0.8381 
1999M06  0.6428  0.0078  0.6506 
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Figure 9.  Transition Probabilities:  Malaysia 
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Figure 10.  Probability of Crisis    1 1    t t S P :  Malaysia 
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Figure 11.  Index of Speculative Pressure:  Malaysia 
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Figure 12.  Probability of Crisis    1    t t ISP P  :  Malaysia 
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Table 10.  MSVAR Model:  Philippines 
   ΔER  ΔFR  ΔID        TVTP   
1  t S :  Turbulent          1  t S : Turbulent       
0   
 
-0.9657  0.4106  -0.3269    0    
   
3.0922    
(0.1572)  (0.1042)  (0.1260)    (4.6215)    
F
i1   
 
-0.0715  -0.1918  -0.0941   
1  : REER 
   
1.4899    
(0.0516)  (0.0121)  (0.0525)    (2.9533)    
F
i2   
 
0.1883  0.0358  -0.0619   
2  : NEGEXPORTG 
   
1.7276    
(0.0299)  (0.0194)  (0.0208)    (3.2797)    
F
i3   
 
-0.1150  0.1571  0.0259   
3  : NEGM2RATIOG 
   
1.4955    
(0.0464)  (0.0183)  (0.0224)    (4.4225)    
4 j   
 
   0.1777  -0.3047    2  t S : Ordinary       
   (0.1039)  (0.0300)    0   
   
2.4849    
5 k   
 
     0.0155    (2.7762)    
      (0.0229)               
2  t S :  Ordinary          LogL     -3420.5    
0   
 
-0.7998  0.3709  -0.3296    AIC     29.0545    
(0.2995)  (0.2703)  (0.1589)    SIC     29.5943    
F
i1   
 
-0.0707  -0.1610  -0.0835    HQ     29.2720    
(0.0845)  (0.1479)  (0.0906)           
F
i2   
 
0.1664  0.0585  -0.0658           
(0.2422)  (0.1226)  (0.1015)           
F
i3   
 
-0.1063  0.1248  0.0204           
(0.0973)  (0.0919)  (0.0456)           
4 j   
 
   0.1672  -0.2937           
   (0.3266)  (0.1419)           
5 k   
 
     0.0036           
      (0.0855)           
1  t S :  Turbulent                 
  
 
   3.4254              
   (0.0532)              
2  t S :  Ordinary                 
  
 
   3.0235              
   (0.1586)              
Note:  Standard error in parenthesis.  Highlighted coefficient estimates are significant at the 10% level..        3 , 3 , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1    k j i . 
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Table 11.  Transition Probabilities:  Philippines 
 Time  p11  P21  p1 
1996M01  0.1415  0.0662  0.2077 
1996M02  0.1890  0.0538  0.2429 
1996M03  0.1928  0.0458  0.2386 
1996M04  0.1859  0.0557  0.2416 
1996M05  0.2378  0.0650  0.3028 
1996M06  0.2956  0.0675  0.3632 
1996M07  0.3541  0.0491  0.4033 
1996M08  0.4004  0.0479  0.4483 
1996M09  0.4415  0.0263  0.4678 
1996M10  0.4515  0.0288  0.4804 
1996M11  0.4624  0.0329  0.4953 
1996M12  0.4073  0.0394  0.4467 
1997M01  0.4401  0.0516  0.4917 
1997M02  0.4883  0.0584  0.5467 
1997M03  0.5458  0.0652  0.6110 
1997M04  0.6085  0.0731  0.6816 
1997M05  0.6564  0.0886  0.7450 
1997M06  0.7426  0.1000  0.8426 
1997M07  0.8424  0.1207  0.9631 
1997M08  0.9615  0.0188  0.9802 
1997M09  0.9762  0.0138  0.9900 
1997M10  0.7466  0.0013  0.7479 
1997M11  0.6147  0.0738  0.6885 
1997M12  0.6842  0.2855  0.9698 
1998M01  0.7312  0.0046  0.7358 
1998M02  0.1181  0.0368  0.1549 
1998M03  0.0962  0.2444  0.3406 
1998M04  0.2537  0.1705  0.4242 
1998M05  0.3492  0.0587  0.4079 
1998M06  0.2841  0.1234  0.4074 
1998M07  0.2548  0.0461  0.3009 
1998M08  0.1117  0.0801  0.1918 
1998M09  0.0888  0.1017  0.1905 
1998M10  0.0900  0.1662  0.2563 
1998M11  0.1238  0.0602  0.1840 
1998M12  0.1289  0.0646  0.1935 
1999M01  0.1410  0.0773  0.2183 
1999M02  0.1534  0.1308  0.2842 
1999M03  0.2679  0.1765  0.4444 
1999M04  0.4387  0.2223  0.6610 
1999M05  0.6587  0.1138  0.7725 
1999M06  0.7554  0.0351  0.7905 
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Figure 13.  Transition Probabilities:  Philippines 
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Figure 14.  Probability of Crisis    1 1    t t S P :  Philippines 
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Figure 15.  Index of Speculative Pressure:  Philippines 
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Figure 16.  Probability of Crisis    1    t t ISP P  :  Philippines 
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4.6  Thailand 
  The potential indicators for Thailand consist of REER, NEGGDP and NFDIFLW.  
See Table 5.2.  Overvaluation of the currency, slowdown in the overall economy and 
large  non-FDI  flows  are  indicators  of  vulnerability  that  can  precipitate  into  a  crisis.  
Although there are no individual significant indicators, the good fit of 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  during 
turbulent periods suggests that they remain useful.  
Table  12  presents  the  final  MSVAR  model  for  the Thailand.    The  common 
standard  deviation  of  the  error  terms,    t S  ,  during  turbulent  periods  is  higher  than 
during ordinary periods.  The three indicators:  real effective exchange rate, economic 
growth and inflow of hot money result in a good fit of 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  during periods of 
speculative pressure.  Figures 17 and 18 show that the model has adequately signaled the 
turbulent  periods  of  the baht  during  the  1980s,  including  early  signals  for  the Asian 
Financial Crisis.  However, there were signals of speculative pressure during the 1990s, 
especially in periods of large fluctuations of the interest rate differentials.  This again 
indicates the sensitiveness of the MSVAR with TVTP to relatively volatile periods of 
even one of the ISP components. 
Although the fit of only NEGGDP is better based on the loglikelihood compared 
to  the  three  indicators  REER,  NEGGDP  and  NFDIFLW taken  together  in  the  TVTP 
equation,  the  individual  indicator  in  the  former  contain s  more  false  signals  in  the 
transition probabilities 
11
t p  and 
1
t p  compared to the combination of the three in the latter.  
This supports the choice of the final model in Table 12 as the better one.  The final model 
provides signal of the Asian Financial Crisis as early as January 1996 with more than 
60% and has increasing probability until July 1997.  
Similar to the three previous countries, in Figures 19 and 20 the ISP derived from 
the  MSVAR  with  TVTP  model  is plotted.    The  ISP  shows  large  fluctuations  during 
turbulent periods for the Thailand baht, especially during the Asian Financial Crisis.  The 
threshold  for  the  ISP  is  again  ISP ISP   5 . 1  .  Comparing  Figures  18  and  20,  which 
correspond respectively to Equations (22) and (23), reveals that although    1 1    t t S P  
has false signals it produces better forecast than    1    t t ISP P   on the Asian Financial   56 
Crisis.  The    1 1    t t S P  is able to detect a currency crisis unlike the    1    t t ISP P   
which provided a signal only at the time of the occurrence of a crisis. 
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Table 12.  MSVAR Model:  Thailand 
   ΔER  ΔFR  ΔID        TVTP   
1  t S :  Turbulent          1  t S : Turbulent       
0   
 
-0.3261  0.7829  -0.2188    0    
   
2.2199    
(0.1349)  (0.1111)  (0.1612)    (4.3410)    
F
i1   
 
0.1553  0.2294  -0.0248   
1  : REER 
  
1.8748    
(0.0134)  (0.0315)  (0.0584)    (4.3787)    
F
i2   
 
0.0642  0.0401  -0.0166   
2  : NEGGDP 
   
2.5973    
(0.0176)  (0.0233)  (0.0305)    (9.8273)    
F
i3   
 
-0.0833  -0.0214  0.1452   
3  : NFDIFLW 
   
1.3600    
(0.0403)  (0.0867)  (0.0249)    (5.4078)    
4 j   
 
   -0.0844  -0.1197    2  t S : Ordinary       
   (0.0169)  (0.0252)    0   
   
1.3450    
5 k   
 
     -0.0224    (2.2511)    
      (0.1047)               
2  t S :  Ordinary          LogL     -3327.8    
0   
 
-0.0682  0.7977  -0.1079    AIC     28.2756    
(0.6473)  (0.1898)  (0.3514)    SIC     28.8154    
F
i1   
 
0.1128  0.2423  0.0154    HQ     28.4932    
(0.1758)  (0.1645)  (0.3165)           
F
i2   
 
0.0350  0.0529  0.0238           
(0.2489)  (0.0441)  (0.1443)           
F
i3   
 
0.0036  0.0065  0.1521           
(0.3255)  (0.1768)  (0.0930)           
4 j   
 
   0.0638  -0.0719           
   (0.2996)  (0.4095)           
5 k   
 
     0.0101           
      (0.1601)           
1  t S :  Turbulent                 
  
 
   3.2159              
   (0.0282)              
2  t S :  Ordinary                 
  
 
   2.7828              
   (0.1722)              
Note:  Standard error in parenthesis.  Highlighted coefficient estimates are significant at the 10% level..        3 , 3 , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1    k j i . 
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Table 13.  Transition Probabilities:  Thailand 
 Time  p11  p21  p1 
1996M01  0.4869  0.1210  0.6079 
1996M02  0.6049  0.1171  0.7220 
1996M03  0.7138  0.0442  0.7580 
1996M04  0.7531  0.0491  0.8022 
1996M05  0.7956  0.0496  0.8452 
1996M06  0.8255  0.0209  0.8464 
1996M07  0.8275  0.0233  0.8508 
1996M08  0.8269  0.0249  0.8518 
1996M09  0.8406  0.0292  0.8698 
1996M10  0.8653  0.0310  0.8963 
1996M11  0.8957  0.0322  0.9278 
1996M12  0.9277  0.0314  0.9591 
1997M01  0.9591  0.0134  0.9725 
1997M02  0.9725  0.0072  0.9797 
1997M03  0.9797  0.0062  0.9859 
1997M04  0.9859  0.0061  0.9920 
1997M05  0.9920  0.0054  0.9973 
1997M06  0.9973  0.0014  0.9987 
1997M07  0.9987  0.0013  1.0000 
1997M08  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1997M09  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1997M10  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1997M11  0.9999  0.0000  0.9999 
1997M12  0.9999  0.0001  1.0000 
1998M01  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M02  0.9999  0.0000  0.9999 
1998M03  0.9999  0.0000  0.9999 
1998M04  0.9999  0.0000  0.9999 
1998M05  0.9999  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M06  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M07  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M08  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M09  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M10  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M11  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1998M12  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
1999M01  0.9999  0.0000  0.9999 
1999M02  0.9995  0.0000  0.9995 
1999M03  0.9980  0.0001  0.9981 
1999M04  0.9942  0.0003  0.9945 
1999M05  0.9927  0.0011  0.9938 
1999M06  0.9925  0.0016  0.9941 
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Figure 17.  Transition Probabilities:  Thailand 
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Figure 18.  Probability of Crisis    1 1    t t S P :  Thailand 
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Figure 19.  Index of Speculative Pressure:  Thailand 
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
ISP
 
 
Figure 20.  Probability of Crisis    1    t t ISP P  :  Thailand 
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4.7  Comparisons of Markov Switching Models with TVTP 
  The results for the four countries present evidence that the MSVAR model is 
more sensitive to information and thus gives stronger early warning signals of a currency 
crisis.  Table 14 shows comparisons of signals of the Asian Financial Crisis among MS 
models.  The results reveal that the MSVAR with TVTP model provides stronger signals 
at an earlier time, in general, compared to the other MSR with TVTP models. 
 
Table 14.   Asian Financial Crisis Signals (>50% or max) Prior to July 1997 
Country  MSVAR with TVTP 
Abiad (2003) 
MSR with TVTP 
Mariano, Abiad, 
Gultekin, Shabbir & 
Tan  (2003) 
MSR with TVTP 
Brunetti, Scotti, 
Mariano & Tan (2008) 
MSR with TVTP 
Indonesia  Nov 1996,  92%  Jun 1997,  45%  Dec 1996,  23%  -- 
Malaysia  Apr 1997,  >50%  Jan 1997,  >50%  Jun 1997,  38%  Jun 1997,  25% 
Philippines  Feb 1997,  >50%  May 1996,  >50%  Feb 1997,  13%  Jun 1997,  12% 
Thailand  Jan 1996,  >50%  Dec 1996,  >50%  Jun 1997,  32%  Jun 1997,  82% 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
  A common indicator that is critical in modeling periods of speculative pressure 
using the MSVAR model with TVTP is the REER.  It results in a good fit of the TVTP 
with the currency crisis episodes.  The overvaluation of the four ASEAN currencies is 
one important factor that subjected them to speculative attack prior to the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997-98.  There are, however, other currency specific factors that also drive the 
TVTP.  The speculative pressure on rupiah has export growth and financial stability of 
banks as significant indicators.   While the speculative pressure on the ringgit involves 
overexpansion of domestic credit and a slowing economy.  The peso has contraction in 
exports and inadequacy of FX reserves.  And for the baht, inflow of hot money and a 
slowdown in the economy serve as early warnings of vulnerability. 
The use of the MSVAR with  TVTP model  confirmed a stylized fact  that the 
turbulent regime has a higher volatility than an ordinary regime in all four currencies.  
This study also demonstrated that the MSVAR with TVTP is highly sensitive to changes 
in the underlying components of the ISP and thus detects periods of speculative pressure 
that  are  not  necessarily  crisis  episodes  as  in  the  case  of  Indonesia  and  Thailand.  
Furthermore,  the  MSVAR  with  TVTP  improved  on  the  univariate  MSR  with  TVTP 
models on predicting the Asian Financial Crisis by giving earlier and stronger signals of a   62 
currency crisis.  Finally, the comparison of the two approaches of extracting information 
from  an  MSVAR  with  TVTP  on  predicting  a  currency  crisis  favors  the  use  of  the 
probability of a crisis based on the transition probabilities instead of a crisis identified by 
the expected ISP when it exceeds its threshold. 
There  are several  areas of future research that can be  explored from  this  MS 
approach to EWS.  First of which is an extension of the MSR-GARCH with TVTP model 
of Brunetti, Scotti, Mariano & Tan (2008) to an MSVAR-GARCH with TVTP to account 
for  heteroskedasticity  between  regimes.    Another  extension  would  be  to  model  an 
MSVAR with TVTP of the ISP of Asian Financial Crisis countries to measure the effect 
of contagion. 
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